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Abstract 
To obtain greater goods decision makers often have to incur and endure costs. Here we 
review mechanisms that enhance the willingness to accept and overcome costs in individual 
and social settings. General, cost-invariant mechanisms involve controlling and reducing 
reward-related impulsivity, abstracting from personal and situational circumstances, changing 
the availability of options in the choice set, and reinterpreting aspects of the choice alternatives. 
These mechanisms are based on fronto-striatal and fronto-parietal networks for valuation and 
goal-setting. More specific, cost-variant mechanisms include effort endurance, imagining 
future events, tolerating risk, and empathy. These mechanisms rely on cost-specific brain 
mechanisms, as well as interactions with the valuation network in accordance with cost-variant 
changes in the valuation of the costly choice alternatives. We identify knowledge gaps, which 
are exacerbated by studies typically focusing only on one cost type. Moreover, many of the 
identified mechanisms of enduring costs provide largely untrodden paths for interventions to 
increase cost endurance in clinical and non-clinical domains. 
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Introduction 
Goal directed actions and value-based decision making rely on implementing the course 
of action or choosing the choice alternative with the best balance between subjective costs and 
subjective benefits. With typical value-based decisions, the alternatives with greater benefits 
are also more costly. Accordingly, when decision makers experience a trade-off between high 
cost, high benefit versus low cost, low benefit alternatives (Table 1), they may follow paths of 
less resistance and choose alternatives with smaller costs. As the choice of the more costly 
alternative may be in some sense better for the decision maker or desired by society, the 
question arises whether and how the willingness to accept costs and the capacity to endure them 
can be increased so that agents obtain greater goods. Here we address this question with a focus 
on psychological and neural mechanisms, reviewing mostly human imaging and transcranial 
stimulation studies. For methodological reasons, these stimulation studies are limited to the 
cortex and neglect subcortical brain regions, whereas a review of single cell recording and 
optogenetic stimulation studies would concentrate more on subcortical structures. 
Costs come in different forms, such as effort, time, risk, and selfishness. Although the 
modalities of these costs differ, their subjective value can be measured experimentally with 
generic currencies such as money in humans or juice in animals. For this review, we propose a 
classification scheme that distinguishes cost-invariant (domain-general) from cost-variant 
(domain-specific) approaches to increasing cost endurance. Cost-invariant mechanisms can be 
used to tilt the cost-benefit balance in the direction of higher cost, higher benefit alternatives 
irrespective of the type of costs or to sculpt the choice space such that lower cost, lower benefit 
alternatives are less likely to be chosen. Cost-variant approaches subjectively modify the 
properties of specific cost types. For example, practicing a particular type of effort would reduce 
the perceived cost of exerting this effort but typically not generalize to increased willingness of 
enduring other types of costs. It should be kept in mind though that the assignment of findings 
to cost-invariant and cost-variant categories remains somewhat tentative in several cases, 
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simply because the question has not been investigated yet as studies often look at only one 
rather than multiple cost types. 
At the neural level, cost-invariant routes to tilting the cost-benefit balance in favor of 
cost endurance for greater goods involve regions that process value irrespective of outcome 
type such as the striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). We consider also 
mechanisms that reduce reward-related impulsivity, i.e., the temptation to give in to selecting 
low cost, low benefit alternatives, implemented by dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); 
mechanisms that facilitate viewing costly choice alternatives from a more distanced 
perspective, implemented by the temporoparietal junction (TPJ); and mechanisms involved in 
removing lower cost, lower benefit alternatives from, or adding higher benefit alternatives to, 
the set of available alternatives, underpinned by the frontal pole (FPC) (Figure 1). Moreover, it 
appears that cost-variant endurance regions can modulate the regions involved in cost-invariant 
endurance mechanisms (Figure 2). 
 
Cost invariant mechanisms 
Cost invariant mechanisms serve general functions for goal-directed behavior, such as 
context-sensitive precision of choice or mental simulation and search [1]. Accordingly, 
although we focus in the following on how these mechanisms can facilitate the choice of high 
cost, high benefit alternatives, it is worth noting that they can just as well facilitate the choice 
of low cost, low benefit alternatives in situations where high cost, high benefit alternatives are 
tempting but ultimately have lower subjective value. In line with this view, brain regions 
underpinning cost-invariant mechanisms also are sensitive to choice difficulty (e.g., [2,3]). 
Such activity may reflect exertion of cognitive control, which during cost-benefit decisions may 
reflect the (context-sensitive) goal of increasing choice precision according to subjective value. 
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Reducing reward-related impulsivity 
Impulsivity can relate to the motor domain (response disinhibition) or to the reward 
domain, with distinct neural underpinning [4]. Here we focus on reward-related impulsivity, 
where tempting but ultimately less beneficial alternatives are chosen. Reward-related 
impulsivity is particularly well-characterized in the domain of delay costs, when immediate 
smaller rewards are preferred over waiting for larger-later rewards. Accordingly, controlling or 
reducing reward-related impulsivity reduces the tendency to select immediate rewards and 
thereby promotes patience for larger rewards in the future [5,6]. Neurally, this mechanism is 
implemented by a corticostriatal network in which DLPFC top-down modulates neural value 
signals in striatum and VMPFC [7,8] (Figure 1), thereby enhancing neural value representations 
of delayed relative to immediate rewards.  
A similar mechanism is hypothesized to inhibit also selfish impulses in social 
interactions [9]. Studies agree on a role of DLPFC activity for social impulse control but 
disagree on whether the impulse being controlled is for prosocial [9,10] or selfish [11,12] 
behavior. In keeping with the cost-invariant nature of impulse control, its function for social 
decisions can be flexibly adapted to internal (e.g., antisocial personality disorder [9,13], 
individual differences in socio-economic status or prosociality [12,14]) and external (e.g., threat 
of punishment [11]) contexts. By extension, the target of impulse control may depend on which 
choice option is associated with an impulse (selfishness or costly sharing in the social domain). 
Impulse control deficits and prefrontal dysfunctions may also contribute to the excessive 
risk-taking behavior that is observed in several psychiatric disorders [15-17]. In line with this 
conjecture, brain stimulation targeting DLPFC was reported to reduce reward-related 
impulsivity in risky decision-making [18,19], suggesting that the costs of risk-seeking behavior 
can be overcome by promoting reward-related impulse control. 
While reducing reward-related impulsivity allows overcoming various types of costs, it 
is important to note that exerting reward-related impulse control requires (mental) effort and is 
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therefore experienced as costly itself [20,21]. Reward-related impulse control thus plays a two-
sided role in trading off costs against benefits, because an individual has to weigh whether a 
goal (for example, a larger-later reward) is worth exerting reward-related impulse control. 
Notably, this account predicts that individuals will decide to exert reward-related impulse 
control only if the subjective net benefit expected from choosing the high cost option and 




A tried and tested cost-invariant method of increasing cost endurance is for decision 
makers to distance themselves from their current situation [22,23]. By projecting themselves 
mentally into the future, into a more remote spatial location, or into the mind of somebody else, 
decision makers appear to be less exposed to their current emotions and better able to overcome 
costs. Recent evidence suggests that the tendency to devalue delayed reward and reward 
received by more distant others is processed by common brain regions [24] and counteracted 
by the ability for perspective taking [25]. Specifically, activity in the TPJ appears to facilitate 
both overcoming present bias in mental time travel [26] and egocentricity bias in social 
interactions [27,28]. Accordingly, disrupting TPJ function with continuous theta burst (cTBS) 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) reduces the willingness to wait and be generous, i.e. 
to overcome temporal and selfish costs [25], in line with the notion that the TPJ facilitates cost-
invariant cost endurance through distancing  (Figure 1). For the social domain, the TPJ was 
shown to facilitate prosocial behavior by increasing the value of sharing in value-encoding 
regions of VMPFC [27]. 
 
Changing the availability of choice options (option editing) 
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In well-structured choice situations where one course of action has to be taken, the high 
cost, high benefit outcome can be secured by removing the low cost, low benefit option from 
the space of available alternatives [29-31]. In other words, through precommitment, people can 
restrict exposure to tempting but ultimately worse options and thereby insure themselves against 
failures in reward-related impulse control. At the neural level, the FPC is more active during 
binding than non-binding choices of larger later rewards  (Figure 1) and communicates with 
regions involved in the control of reward-related impulses, such as the DLPFC and posterior 
parietal cortex at the time of precommitment decisions [32]. Moreover, upregulation of 
frontopolar activity with anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) increases the 
number of precommitment decisions without affecting other cost-invariant functions such as 
preference for larger rewards or reward-related impulse control [33]. Thus, FPC appears to play 
a crucial role for restricting the choice space through precommitment. 
The opposite of precommitment is to generate further choice alternatives. This function 
is particularly important in ill-structured real-life situations and impaired in patients with 
reduced motivation [34]. Moreover, by creating additional courses of action, one may be able 
to reach a given goal without having to endure as many costs as with the given alternatives. 
Interestingly, the FPC is also more active during option generation than during a control 
condition where options are read passively [35]. Taken together, precommitment and option 
generation data point to a central role of FPC in sculpting the choice space for goal-directed 
actions and value-based decisions.  
How exactly the FPC implements the sculpting of the choice space is not entirely clear 
yet. While the FPC has been associated with several functions, probably the most relevant in 
the current context is its proposed role in processing the values of alternative (typically 
unchosen) choice options [36]. In line with this function, enhancing FPC excitability with 
anodal tDCS increases the willingness to exert both mental and physical effort for rewards [37]. 
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In other words, typically rejected high cost, high benefit options became more valuable under 
stimulation, speaking to one possible mechanism with which FPC may sculpt choice space. 
 
Framing 
The way choice options are presented crucially determines how the values of these 
options are processed, a phenomenon referred to as “framing”. Accordingly, overcoming 
various types of costs can be facilitated by framing choices such that a higher value is assigned 
to the high cost, high benefit relative to the low cost, low benefit option. Evidence for framing 
effects originally stems from the domain of risky decisions, where humans are risk-seeking if 
outcomes are framed as losses but risk-averse if outcomes are framed as gains [38]. Thus, while 
for gains variability (as compared to safe lower rewards) is perceived as cost, in the loss domain 
individuals experience highly likely or safe losses (relative to less likely higher losses) as 
subjectively more costly. This allows to bias an intended behavior by framing a choice problem 
accordingly: if risky behavior is more costly in a given context (e.g., smoking, obesity, 
unprotected sex), the outcomes should be presented as gains to bias risk-averse actions. 
The effectiveness of re-framing choice problems for biasing desired outcomes is not 
restricted to the domain of risk, as framing was also found to promote patience in intertemporal 
decisions [39,40] and to modulate social preferences [41]. On a neural level, framing generally 
appears to modulate activation in brains regions that are related to the processing of the 
subjective value of costs and rewards, such as insula, amygdala, and VMPFC [40,42,43]. 
Moreover, framing can reduce reward-related activity in the striatum [39,40] (Figure 1). 
 
Cost variant mechanisms 
Enduring more mental and physical effort 
In everyday life, obtaining larger rewards often requires exerting more mental or 
physical effort (subjective strain) than obtaining smaller rewards. Accordingly, effort-based 
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decisions consist of a trade-off between high effort, high reward versus low effort, low reward 
options (Table 1). By extension, one method of overcoming high effort costs in a cost-variant 
fashion consists of reducing the subjective strain of exerting high effort.  
The subjective costs of exerting mental effort are thought to be encoded in lateral 
prefrontal cortex [44,45] and amygdala [46], whereas the costs of physical effort have been 
associated with the supplementary motor area (SMA) [45,47,48]. Note though that common 
coding of both cost types may be more prevalent than cost type-specific coding, and has been 
reported in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), DLPFC, intraparietal sulcus, and insula [46]. 
Mental or physical training facilitates performance in the trained types of effort and modulates 
activation in brain regions related to effort production [49,50]. However, these regions relate 
not only to the goal-directed production of effort, but they are also hypothesized to encode the 
expected effort costs when deciding whether or not to engage in effort (before the actual effort 
production). If this hypothesis is correct, it should be possible to enhance the willingness to 
exert effort by suppressing or disrupting neural activity in these regions. Indeed, a recent study 
reported that disrupting the SMA with cTBS-TMS increased the motivation to engage in 
rewarded physical effort by lowering the perceived strain of effort in a grip force task [51] 
(Figure 2A). Neural interventions targeting the neural basis of subjective effort demands 
therefore allow improving the motivation to overcome effort costs.  
The motivation to engage in rewarded effort may depend not only on the expected 
benefits and the required costs per se, but also on how an individual weighs effort costs against 
the rewards at stake. The ACC is thought to play a central role in trading-off effort costs against 
benefits [20,52], given that ACC is structurally and functionally connected to the ventral 
striatum [53] as well as to regions encoding cognitive and physical effort costs, such as the 
SMA [47,54]. The ACC has therefore been hypothesized to motivate effortful behavior by top-
down modulating striatal value signals [55]. In fact, ACC lesions reduce the willingness to exert 
both physical and mental effort for rewards [56,57]. The ACC may thus integrate information 
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on the incentive value of rewards at stake and the required effort costs in order to decide whether 
a reward is worth the effort.  
Finally, it is conceivable that noradrenergic projections to the ACC [58] contribute to 
these decisions. In any case, decisions that a reward is worth the effort were found to be 
followed by increased activation of noradrenergic neurons in the locus coeruleus [59,60]. Thus, 
noradrenaline may have a crucial role for energizing behavior during effort production. 
 
Waiting longer 
Temporal delay devalues given benefits (Table 1). Waiting longer for larger benefits 
rather than selecting smaller sooner benefits requires enduring not only opportunity costs but 
in some cases also cognitive costs due to the need to delay gratification. One way of increasing 
the ability to wait in a time cost-variant fashion is to project oneself into the future. For example, 
reminders of personal events that will happen at a particular time in the future facilitate choice 
of larger later benefits at those future time points compared to a condition without reminders 
[61]. The effect of the reminders increases with the vividness with which one imagines the 
future events. Thus, the ability to imagine future events, including the ability to imagine rewards 
more generally [62], is associated with increased willingness to endure delay costs. An obvious 
follow-on question is whether imagination of future events can be trained and whether such 
training facilitates waiting longer. Research in elderly participants [63] and in the motor domain 
[64] suggests that such interventions can result at least in changed imagery and brain responses. 
At the neural level, imagination is associated with activity in VMPFC and lateral parietal 
cortex and the individual size of the behavioral imagination effect correlates with activity in a 
subregion of the ACC [61,65]. Gradations in coupling of this ACC region with the hippocampus 
(and the amygdala) underlie gradations in the size of the imagination effect particularly for 
unfamiliar future events whereas familiar future events rely more on ACC-ventral striatum 
coupling [66] (Figure 2B). Thus, distinct properties of the imagined future events appear to be 
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reflected in distinct neural interactions, even though the facilitating effects on patience are 
similar. Moreover, the findings are in line with recent literature showing that frontostriatal 
connectivity facilitates patience [67-70], although it remains unclear how specific this 
connection is to enduring temporal as opposed to other types of costs. 
 
Taking more risk 
For gains, humans are typically risk averse; in other words, up to some point, they prefer 
safer alternatives over riskier alternatives even if the returns (expected values) of the safer 
alternatives are lower than those of the riskier alternatives (Table 1). Viewed from this 
perspective, risk is a cost in the gain domain and may or may not be overcome by appropriate 
circumstances, task designs, or interventions. One possibility arises from (perceived) stake size. 
Compared to large stakes, small stakes are also associated with less risk aversion (or even risk-
seeking rather than risk aversion [71]). Moreover, poverty, risk of starvation and externally set 
targets all are thought to increase risk taking, particularly of course if the amount provided by 
safe alternatives is not sufficient for survival or for reaching the targets [72,73]. It should be 
kept in mind though that once critical wealth thresholds surpassed, risk aversion increases 
[74,75]. In-line with this mechanism of counteracting risk costs, reward regions such as the 
striatum and VMPFC keep track of current wealth and the context in which gains occur, both 
within tasks [76,77] and individuals [78]. A model that assigns the influence of current wealth 
level to decision bias rather than subjective value representation best explains how wealth 
affects the propensity to make risky decisions [77]. Moreover, increasing pressure to make risky 
decisions because targets are not yet attained appears to be tracked by dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex [79].  
Stimulation studies suggest that interventions targeting DLPFC affect risk taking, 
although the degree to which these interventions are cost-variant remains to be investigated. 
For example, disrupting right DLPFC function with 1-Hz repetitive TMS increases risk taking 
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[80], whereas anodal tDCS of right DLPFC reduces it [81] (Figure 2C). Under a cost-invariant 
reward-related impulse control interpretation of these results, DLPFC would control the 
impulse elicited by the lure of large gains. However, the effects of DLPFC stimulation on risk 
taking seem to be more pronounced in ‘cold’ tasks, where the outcomes of risky decisions are 
not realized in every trial, than in ‘hot’ tasks, where participants experience outcomes after each 
decision ([82]; see also [83]). This finding suggests that reward-related impulse control may 
not be the mechanism through which DLPFC contributes to risk aversion, at least under the 
assumption that reward-related impulses are stronger in hot than cold tasks. 
Another stimulation study proposes a rather specific effect on risk taking of parietal 
cortex. Specifically, downregulation of left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) with 1-Hz repetitive TMS 
increases risk aversion for gambles with high variance (p=0.5), without affecting ambiguity 
aversion or risk preferences for gambles with lower variance (p=0.25, p=0.75. However, the 
high variance gambles also happened to be closest to indifference in the control stimulation 
condition, which could have facilitated finding a TMS-effect [84]. By extension, one may want 
to test whether upregulation of IPS would facilitate risk taking. 
 
Helping others 
Sharing goods with others is costly if the act of giving reduces one’s own outcome. 
However, sharing is also considered as highly desirable in most societies. Accordingly, trade-
offs can arise between maximizing one’s own outcome and costly helping others, raising the 
question of how the selfish impulse of avoiding costs to oneself can be overcome in order to 
create higher social benefits. One important motivation for costly sharing is empathy, the 
capacity to feel what another person is feeling. Empathic concern for others’ suffering appears 
to be a driving force for altruistic behavior [85-87]. Empathy for the outcomes of others may 
also be fueled by a preference for equality [88], a further mechanism for overcoming selfishness 
[89].  
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At the neural level, empathy for the pain of others has been related to activation in 
anterior insula [85,90] (Figure 2D). Moreover, connectivity of the anterior insula with the 
anterior cingulate cortex predicts helping behavior [91]. The link between empathy and costly 
helping is further evidenced by findings that empathy can activate regions of the dopaminergic 
reward system [86], which encodes not only selfish outcomes but rewards for others as well 
[92-94]. Recent evidence suggests, however, that the dopaminergic system’s sensitivity to 
costly sharing may be gender-specific, with the dopaminergic system being more sensitive to 
shared than selfish rewards in women and to selfish than shared rewards in men [95]. Thus, in 
females, the dopaminergic system might underpin the experience of a “warm glow” promoting 
costly giving.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
We proposed a systematic classification scheme of cost-invariant and cost-variant 
mechanisms for overcoming various types of costs in value-based decision-making. Cost 
invariant mechanisms modify how decision makers respond to (reward-related impulse control) 
or perceive (distancing, framing) the properties of choice options or of the choice set (option 
editing). These mechanisms are involved in overcoming more than one type of cost and are thus 
more powerful than cost-variant mechanisms, which modify the cost-specific aspects of 
outcome and action representations.  
At the neural level, the distinct mechanisms for overcoming costs are implemented by 
dissociable brain regions. DLPFC implements control processes that inhibit the impulse to 
choose less costly, but also less beneficial options across various domains of cost types, 
consistent with a general function of DLPFC for cognitive control and goal-directed behavior 
[96,97]. Also other brain regions related to cost-invariant and cost-variant mechanisms, such as 
FPC and ACC, are well known to contribute to successfully pursuing one’s goals [20,98,99]. 
The TPJ, in contrast, had mainly been linked to social cognition so far, but recent evidence 
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suggests the TPJ to play a role for overcoming the costs of delayed rewards as well [25]. Most 
of these mechanisms bias the decision for costly larger rewards by top-down modulating neural 
value signals encoded in VMPFC and striatum, which are both innervated by dopamine 
neurons. The dopaminergic value system thus represents a key player for trading off rewards 
against the required costs, which is supported by findings showing that dopaminergic 
manipulations change the willingness to overcome costs in all domains discussed here 
[93,95,100-102]. 
From a clinical perspective, the multitude of mechanisms that can be invoked to 
overcome costs may explain why disorders or lesions sometimes have more limited effects than 
one would expect. Yet, basic motivation to overcome larger costs for larger benefits is a 
fundamental prerequisite for deploying alternate mechanisms in the first place. Accordingly, 
disorders that affect this motivation and its neural basis may be most susceptible to showing 
more profound deficits. Examples include disorders with pronounced negative symptoms, such 
as depression [103], schizophrenia [104], and Parkinson’s disease [105]. In other disorders, 
cost-benefit calculations change through the repeated (impulsive or compulsive) use of 
reinforcers, such as addiction and obesity [106]. For all of these disorders, methods that 
upregulate motivation for attaining behavior change and ultimately clinical improvement may 
be associated with high costs but eventually higher benefits. Some of the present interventions 
have already been applied to a clinical context (although interventions often use a non-
motivational focus [107,108]). For example, in an option-editing study conducted in Nova 
Scotia (described in [109]), out of 88 compliant gamblers, 55 reduced overall spending, six 
showed no change and 27 increased spending with a voluntary pre-commitment device that 
allowed limiting the amount and time that people could gamble. Likewise, a similar trial in 
Australia found that spending increased particularly in those gamblers who made no use of the 
precommitment device of setting a spending limit [109]. The effects of interventions likely 
depend on how exactly they are implemented, with the possibility of unintended effects. In any 
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case, we see untapped potential particularly for psychiatric disorders suffering from 
impairments in overcoming costs. For example, addiction has been conceptualized as reduced 
ability to delay gratification [110], and interventions mainly targeted impulse control skills and 
DLPFC to improve resistance to immediate rewards [111]. However, as reward-related impulse 
control is only one mechanism contributing to delaying gratification, it may be worth exploring 
the effects of interventions that target distancing or option editing as well. The above reported 
study on the effectiveness of precommitment devices for pathological gambling suggests that 
such intervention strategies might improve self-control particularly in impulsive individuals.   
It should be noted that the present scheme is limited by the fact that studies typically 
investigate one cost type and one mechanism at a time. Moreover, even within the mechanisms 
and cost types considered here, substantial gaps remain in the literature (Table 2). A fruitful 
approach for future research might thus be to fill these gaps by testing a potential involvement 
of cost-invariant mechanisms also in domains where the contribution of a particular mechanism 
has not been clarified yet. Similarly, mechanisms considered as “cost-variant” here might turn 
out to be involved in overcoming other cost types as well. For example, several studies suggest 
that the ACC may perform cost-benefit computations in multiple domains, even though this has 
not been tested fully so far. We therefore consider our schema for cost-variant and –invariant 
mechanisms to represent merely the current state-of-the-field that will be complemented and 
modified by future research. 
It is further worth noting that the definition of “cost” turned out to be highly context-
specific: both risk-proneness and risk-aversion prevent achievement of larger expected values. 
Likewise, in patients with antisocial personality disorder selfishness represents the costs that 
need to be overcome, but the opposite – extreme prosociality – might be considered as 
dysfunctional as well [112]. Here, the function of mechanisms promoting goal achievement like 
reward-related impulse control is determined by an agent’s goals in a given situation. Thus, 
individual differences co-determine the definition of what is costly [113]. 
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To sum up, the schema of cost-variant and cost-invariant mechanisms we developed 
here shows the commonalities, but also the distinctiveness, between neuro-cognitive 
mechanisms for overcoming costs. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms may allow 
improving cost-endurance in both healthy individuals and psychiatric populations. 
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Domain Cost Trade-off (high cost, high benefit vs. low cost, low 
benefit) 
Effort Doing mental or physical work Higher effort, higher value vs. lower effort, lower 
value  
Time Waiting for delayed outcomes Later, larger rewards vs. sooner smaller rewards 
Risk Variability in gains (gain frame) 
 
Certainty of loss (loss frame) 
Higher risk, higher expected value vs. lower risk, 
lower expected value 
Sure loss, higher expected value vs. risky loss, lower 
expected value 
Social Sharing goods with others Smaller self, larger social rewards vs. larger self, 
smaller social rewards 
 
Table 1. Overview over cost domains, cost types, and trade-offs in cost-benefit decision-
making. Expected value = sum of probability-weighted outcome magnitudes 
 
  




 Reducing reward-related 
impulsivity 
Distancing Option editing Framing 
Effort [20,21]  [34,35]  
Time [5-8] [25] [32,33] [39,40] 
Risk [18,19]   [38] 
Social [9-12] [25,27,28]  [41,42] 
 
Table 2. Overview of studies as a function of cost type (rows) and cost-invariant mechanisms 
(columns) for overcoming costs. Note that studies typically investigate one single cost type 
together with one single mechanism. 
 
  




Figure 1. Neural basis of cost-invariant mechanisms. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
implements goal-directed behavior by controlling and reducing reward-related impulsivity, 
whereas temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) allows overcoming egocentricity bias and directing 
attention to the future or to the needs of others (distancing). DLPFC and TPJ shift the cost-
benefit balance towards costly larger rewards by top-down modulating neural value signals in 
VMPFC and striatum. Frontopolar cortex (FPC) has a general role in evaluating conflicting 
goals and sculpting choice space (option evaluation/editing) and may implement 
precommitment decisions via top-down modulating DLPFC. Framing modulates brain activity 
in regions processing the values of rewards and costs, such as the VMPFC and the striatum.  
 
Figure 2. Neural basis of cost-variant mechanisms. (A) In effort-based decision making, the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) trades off the expected benefits against the subjective strain of 
exerting effort. Subjective strain of cognitive and physical effort appears to be encoded by 
DLPFC and supplementary motor area (SMA), respectively. If the expected benefit is 
considered worth the effort, locus coeruleus (LC) energizes behavior via noradrenergic 
projections to ACC. (B) In intertemporal decision-making, the ACC is related to projecting 
oneself into the future in order to overcome delay costs. Moreover, the ACC shows functional 
coupling with the hippocampus when imagining unfamiliar future events and with the striatum 
when imagining familiar future events. (C) Risk aversion is implemented by DLPFC, with the 
strength of risk aversion depending on an individual’s current wealth status which is tracked by 
striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). (D) In social interactions, empathic 
concern for others’ suffering is encoded by the anterior insula and ACC.  
  







Neural mechanisms of overcoming costs           26 
  
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
